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This paper estimates a job search model with savings and determines optimal unemployment
bene¯t policy for the estimated model. For observed and unobserved worker characteristics,
the estimation strategy relates observed unemployment spell durations to the model implied
unemployment hazard rate. The model is estimated on Danish unemployment spell data which
include high quality wealth and income information. The estimation shows that Danish workers
respond to changes in economic incentives in ways consistent with the model and that the
magnitude of the e®ect of the responses on the unemployment hazard rate is small.
Optimal unemployment bene¯t level policy is determined as a trade-o® between providing
insurance against consumption °uctuation and the moral hazard of reducing the worker's in-
centives to search back into employment. Given the estimated low level of moral hazard, the
optimal bene¯t level is quite high even though workers can self-insure via savings. Depending
on the interest rate which is e®ectively the cost of using savings as self-insurance, the optimal
replacement rate ranges between 43% and 82%. The policy analysis emphasizes the importance
of including transitional dynamics to avoid a signi¯cant downward bias associated with a simple
steady state comparison analysis.
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11 Introduction
This paper estimates a job search model with savings on Danish unemployment spell data and
determines optimal unemployment bene¯t levels for the estimated model. The advantage of a
structural estimation in this setting is that it allows the counterfactual experiment that is the
optimal bene¯t policy analysis. Optimal unemployment bene¯t policy is determined as a trade-o®
between providing insurance against income loss and the moral hazard problem of reducing workers'
incentives to search back into employment and thereby extending unemployment spell duration.
Thus, optimal bene¯t policy will be sensitive to model parameters that a®ect the risk aversion
in consumption as well as the extend of the moral hazard in the model. By relating observed
unemployment durations to the model's unemployment hazard rate, the estimation determines
these and other model parameters - and consequently optimal bene¯t levels.
Workers can insure themselves against income °uctuations by saving income from one period
to another. Hence, the extend to which they demand additional insurance in the form of unem-
ployment bene¯ts depends on the access to and cost of savings as a self insurance instrument.
In particular, for a given subjective discount rate the optimal replacement rate (that is, the ben-
e¯t level relative to the expected wage) is highly sensitive to the interest rate, ranging from a
43% replacement rate for an interest rate almost equal to the subjective discount rate to an 82%
replacement rate for a zero interest rate.
Conditioning on observed and unobserved worker characteristics, the identi¯cation strategy
relates observed unemployment durations to the model implied unemployment hazard rate which
is proportional to the search choice. To this end, data are needed where unemployment spell
durations are linked to observed worker characteristics. In particular, since savings and earnings
play an important part in the paper, high quality wealth and income data are needed. Data like
this are hard to come by, however one such dataset is Statistics Denmark's 0.5 percent sample
which was generously made available by Centre for Labour Market and Social Research in º Arhus,
Denmark.
The model estimation successfully captures key relationships in data. Notably, wealthier in-
dividuals are observed to experience longer unemployment durations which is explained by the
2model via a negative relationship between the choice of search intensity and savings.1 Further-
more, data show a U-shaped relationship between unemployment duration and the expected wage
of the worker. While not widely recognized, this type of relationship is quite natural in a sequential
job search model with savings. Whereas, sequential search and directed search models without sav-
ings imply monotone relationships between unemployment duration and the wage. Both of these
relationships are robust to conditioning on observed and unobserved worker characteristics. They
are both important identi¯ers of the curvature of the utility of consumption function. The estimate
implies a constant relative risk aversion coe±cient of 2:21.
Thus, the workers in the data respond to changes in economic incentives in ways that are
consistent with the sequential job search model with savings. However, the magnitude of the
change in the unemployment hazard rate that results from these responses is quite small. The
model estimation captures this fact via a high degree of curvature in the search cost function
and/or o®er arrival rate function. The two functions are not separately identi¯ed. Thus, the
model estimation implies a low degree of moral hazard - the unemployment hazard rate is not very
sensitive to changes in economic incentives.
The unemployment bene¯t policy is restricted to a constant level bene¯t path of in¯nite du-
ration. The system is assumed to be ¯nanced by a proportional income tax and the bene¯t-tax
scheme is restricted to satisfy inter-temporal budget balance. One may consider systems with ¯-
nite duration bene¯ts, however the results in Davidson and Woodbury (1997) suggest that it is
optimal to extend the duration of a constant level bene¯t system inde¯nitely.2 The policy analysis
is ignoring the issue of optimal design over duration which has been analyzed in search models
without savings in Shavell and Weiss (1979) and Hopenhayn and Nicolini (1997). However, the
more advanced bene¯t paths that vary continuously over unemployment duration are likely not
politically implementable. Furthermore, Werning's (2002) and Kocherlakota's (2003) studies of op-
timal bene¯t design over unemployment duration in job search models with unobservable savings
suggest that a constant level, in¯nite duration bene¯t path may in fact be the optimally designed
path or at least not far from it.
Studies such as Acemoglu and Shimer (1999) show that there may be e±ciency issues associated
1This relationship has previously been established on Danish, Dutch and French data in Lentz and Tran½s (2002),
Bloemen and Stancanelli (2001) and Algan, Ch¶ eron, Hairault, and Langot (2001), respectively.
2The result is shown via model simulations and is not established generally, though.
3with providing unemployment bene¯ts. However, in this study the role of unemployment bene¯ts is
purely one of providing insurance against consumption °uctuations at the cost of distorting search
incentives. Papers such as Bailey (1978), Flemming (1978), Hansen and Imrohoroglu (1992), and
Wang and Williamson (1999) have studied this question in models with savings. However, it is
a common feature of these papers as well as the broader literature on optimal unemployment
insurance that the use of savings as a self insurance instrument has been seriously curtailed.3 I
¯nd that once these restrictions are lifted, the demand for additional insurance in the form of
unemployment bene¯ts is dramatically reduced.
The preferred method of determining the optimal level of unemployment bene¯ts seems to be
by comparing some social welfare criterion across steady states associated with di®erent bene¯t-
tax schemes. I show that once savings are included in the analysis, one must include transitional
dynamics in order to avoid a serious downward bias in the optimal bene¯t results. The policy study
in this paper includes full transitional dynamics.
The analysis of the job search model with savings is complicated by the inability to establish
global concavity of the value functions. Danforth (1979) shows that in the special case where
employment is an absorbing state, one can characterize the reservation wage choice in relation to
the degree of absolute risk aversion of the utility function. In the case of decreasing absolute risk
aversion, the reservation wage choice will be increasing in wealth. Flemming (1978) and Acemoglu
and Shimer (1999) are examples of the constant absolute risk aversion case combined with the
assumption that search costs are monetary, and that there is no lower bound on wealth.4 In this
case, the search choice is una®ected by wealth and the results for this special case do generalize to
the case in which employment is not an absorbing state. However in general, once employment is no
longer an absorbing state, the inability to establish global concavity of the value functions impedes
construction of characterization theorems of the worker's search and savings choices. Lentz and
Tran½s (2002) establish su±cient conditions to provide characterization theorems for the search
intensity model for this more general case.
The paper is structured as follows. In section 2 the model is laid out and its key characteristics
3In studies where savings are allowed, the return to savings is often set at such a low rate that holding savings
becomes quite costly and consequently the option to use savings as a self-insurance instrument has low value
4In the reservation wage setup, search costs are necessarily monetary in that an increase in the hazard rate due to
a lower reservation wage choice will be associated with lower expected future income. In the search intensity setup,
the search costs are paid in the same period and enter via the budget constraint.
4are explained. Section 3 presents the estimation strategy, data, and estimation results. Based
on the results of the estimation, the paper proceeds by determining optimal bene¯t levels at an
individual level in section 4.1 and section 4.2 considers optimal group wide insurance schemes.
Finally, section 5 concludes.
2 The Model
Consider a utility maximizing worker who faces risk of job loss. When employed he receives a ¯xed
wage w and during unemployment he receives unemployment bene¯ts b, where b < w. The worker
can smooth consumption over income states by use of savings that carry a return of r: There are
no other insurance instruments available to the worker.
Generally, the worker faces two decision problems; how much to consume and how much to
search. The objective is to maximize the discounted stream of future utility which is assumed to be
separable in both time as well as consumption and search. During employment, the decision problem
facing the worker is simply how much to save for the next period. Since the wage distribution is
degenerate, on-the-job search is ruled out and issues such as e®ort choices on the job will also
be ignored. It will simply be assumed that the worker faces an exogenous job separation rate ±.
During unemployment, the decision problem is more complex. Like in the state of employment, the
worker will have to decide how much to save. Furthermore, the worker decides how much e®ort to
put into job search. A higher search intensity will raise the probability of receiving a job o®er but
also implies a greater utility loss.
Workers are assumed to be in¯nitely lived. The estimation strategy in the following section
relates observed unemployment duration to the model implied search choice while conditioning on
observed wealth holdings. The alternative assumption of ¯nitely lived workers will introduce life
cycle savings motives but will not have a great impact on the search choice for a given wealth level.
As such, for estimation purposes the issue of ¯nitely versus in¯nitely lived agents is not of great
concern.
It is assumed that all workers are eligible to receive b and that bene¯ts are of in¯nite duration.
This is motivated by the actual Danish unemployment system in which bene¯t duration in the
1980's and early 1990's was at times in¯nite and at no point shorter than 5 years. If a worker is no
longer eligible to receive unemployment bene¯ts he moves into the welfare system where he receives
5payments roughly equal to 2/3 of the unemployment bene¯ts. During the bene¯t period, the UI
system would force the worker to accept brief employment spells or education o®ers. But the ¯rst of
these `harassments' was not forced on the worker until after more than two years of unemployment.
The average unemployment spell in the data is 14 weeks. While there are restrictions on eligibility,
they are generally quite easy to satisfy and the question of qualifying for bene¯ts is not of great
concern for the Danish worker. The system is voluntary and if the worker decides to participate
he must pay an insurance premium. The system is heavily subsidized and the worker pays only
about 1/3 of the actual premium. Thus, not surprisingly more than 80% of the labor force choose
to participate in the system. Non-participants are generally very low wage workers and very high
wage workers. For the very low wage workers, the welfare system will provide comparable insurance
to the UI system. For the very high wage workers, the UI system provides very little insurance
due to an upper bound on bene¯t payments. In e®ect, the upper bound on bene¯t payments is so
restrictive that the Danish UI system can be characterized by a wage independent bene¯t scheme.
In the data in this paper, everybody faces the same constant level of bene¯ts except for the lowest
4 percent of the wage earners. The lowest 4 percent of wage earners receive bene¯ts equal to 90%
of their previous wage.
It is assumed that each worker faces a wage distribution in which the second and higher moments
are zero. Di®erent workers may face di®erent wage distribution means and as such the overall
economy will display a full wage distribution. But each worker faces a single wage only. The
assumption rules out reservation wage considerations and is a simpli¯cation relative to the fairly
large literature on estimation of job search models. See Devine and Kiefer (1991), Wolpin (1995),
and Van den Berg (1999) for a survey of the literature. I will be employing an estimation strategy
that relates observed unemployed spell duration to the model implied unemployment hazard rate
for given worker characteristics. It is well known that the search choice is sensitive to the moments
of the wage o®er distribution. I will be capturing individual variation in the ¯rst moment and its
e®ect on the unemployment hazard rate. The decision to focus on the search intensity choice only is
in part also driven by the desire for a relatively simple model in which one can carry out an optimal
unemployment bene¯t analysis. The reservation wage model is considerably more complicated
in this respect and the optimal unemployment bene¯t design literature has consequently almost
exclusively focused on the search intensity model.
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where kt is the worker's wealth at time t. r is the interest rate and ½ is the subjective discount
rate. nt 2 f0;1g denotes the state of employment at time t, where n = 1 denotes employment and
n = 0 denotes unemployment. It is assumed that u(¢) is strictly increasing and strictly concave,
e(¢) is strictly increasing and weakly convex with e(0) = 0; and ¹(¢) is strictly increasing and
strictly concave with ¹(0) = 0 and limx!1 ¹(x) = 1: ¸ will be referred to as an o®er arrival rate.
One can equally well think of this simply as a parameter of the ¹(¢) function. In the structural
estimation in the following sections it will be assumed that worker heterogeneity can enter via the
¸ parameter. The lower bound on wealth k can be interpreted as a capital market imperfection.
However, it can also simply be a lower bound that naturally arises from the assumption of non-
negative consumption combined with asymptotic budget balance. See Aiyagari (1994) for more on
this type of argument. The upper bound will be set so that it is not restrictive in equilibrium. This
can be done as long as r < ½.
The model can be formulated recursively. Let Ve (k) be the maximal present value of being
employed with wealth k. Similarly, Vu (k) is the value function associated with unemployment at
wealth k. Let the choice of next period's wealth level be denoted by k0. The Bellman-equations of
the model can then be stated as:
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where ¡y (k) = fk0 2 Rjk · k0 · (1 + r)k + yg: It will right away be assumed that:
¹(¸s) = 1 ¡ e¡¸s: (3)
7The policy functions of the model, savings when employed and unemployed as well as the
choice of search intensity are denoted by ke (k); ku (k) and s(k); respectively. The model is
analytically quite intractable and it is hard to establish analytical characterizations of the model's
value and policy functions. However, it is straightforward to solve the model numerically. The
model estimation and the policy analysis in the following sections rely on numerical methods to
solve the model.
Under a set of su±cient conditions, most notably the existence of a lottery in wealth, Lentz
and Tran½s (2002) show that separability between consumption and search in the utility function
will result in a decreasing search intensity choice in wealth. The su±cient conditions ensure con-
cavity of the value functions. While the su±cient conditions have not been made in the model at
hand, numerical model solutions in this paper always yield globally concave value functions and
consequently given the separable utility function assumption that the search choice is decreasing in
wealth. Intuitively, search intensity is decreasing in wealth because the gains to search Ve (k)¡Vu (k)
can be shown to diminish as wealth increases. Due to the separability in the utility function, the
search costs will be una®ected by wealth holdings and the result follows directly.
Given r < ½, the worker will always reduce wealth holdings during unemployment spells. There
exists an upper wealth bound below which the worker will increase wealth holdings while employed.
For wealth holdings above the upper wealth bound, the worker dissaves in both employment states
but the worker always dissaves by more in the unemployed state.
In a regular search model without savings, it is well known that a right-shift of the wage o®er
distribution will increase the search intensity choice.5 In the model at hand, an increase in the wage
represents such a right-shift. However, once savings are included in the model the monotonicity
result no longer holds. When the worker can smooth consumption via savings, a right-shift in
the wage o®er distribution is associated with two opposing e®ects analogous to the income and
substitution e®ects associated with a wage increase in labor supply theory. A right-shift of the
wage distribution implies a greater pay-o® to search activity and the substitution e®ect dictates
that the worker substitute into more search. However, when the worker can transfer income from
the employed to the unemployed state via for example savings, a right-shift in the wage distribution
is also associated with an income e®ect which dictates that the unemployed worker search less. In
5See among others Mortensen (1986).
8the case where the worker cannot transfer income from the employed state to the unemployed
state either because she is at the lower wealth bound or because wealth cannot be stored, there is
only a substitution e®ect. In the case where workers can save, model simulations suggest that the
substitution e®ect dominates at low wage levels where the search choice is consequently increasing in
the wage. If the utility of consumption has a su±cient amount of curvature, the income e®ect will
eventually begin to dominate resulting in a decreasing relationship between the search intensity
choice and the wage. It is tempting to extend these results to a decrease in the bene¯t level.
However, in this case the substitution and income e®ects both point in the same direction. Policy
function characterization is discussed in greater detail in the appendix.
3 Estimation of the Model
I will estimate the model by relating observed unemployment spell durations to the model implied
unemployment hazard rate. Let hi (¿) be the model implied unemployment hazard rate in the ¿'th
period of the unemployment spell. The probability of observing a spell length t for worker i is
then simply Pr(Ti = t) = hi (t)¦t¡1
¿=1hi (¿) which is the basis of the likelihood function for the data.
The estimation strategy requires unemployment spell duration data where observed unemployment
spell durations are linked with observed worker characteristics.
Denote by tij the length of worker i's j'th spell. Let zij denote wether the spell is right
censored. ·ij is worker i's observed wealth level at the outset of the j'th spell and wij is the wage
that the worker is expecting to receive in the new job. Finally, denote by Xij a set of other worker
characteristics which includes education, age, gender, spouse's income, number of children, and
occupation.
The search intensity choice will be characterized by positive duration dependence because wealth
is being gradually reduced throughout the spell. Given an observed initial amount of wealth at
the outset of the spell ·, one can infer the search intensity choice at any point during the spell.
The wealth inference is made by iterating on ku (¢) (i.e. the inference about the worker's wealth
holdings one period into an unemployment spell is ku (·)). Naturally, in the case where one directly
observes wealth throughout the spell, this procedure is moot. Such wealth data is not available,
though. Wealth is only observed at a yearly frequency. Therefore, one cannot observe the change
9in wealth holdings during the spell which is observed at a weekly frequency. 6
In the estimation of the model, worker heterogeneity can enter via wealth at the outset of the
spell ·, the wage level w and the o®er arrival rate ¸. While the o®er arrival rate is not itself observ-
able, all of the remaining observed worker heterogeneity will enter via this parameter. Furthermore,
the estimation will also allow unobserved worker heterogeneity to enter via the o®er arrival rate.
The unobserved heterogeneity is assumed to be uncorrelated with the observed worker character-
istics and is analyzed in much the same way as in Heckman and Singer (1984). In particular, it is
assumed that:
¸ij (¯;¾i) = e
X0
ij¯+¾i; ¾i » G(¢);
where ¯ will be a set of parameters to be estimated.7 The unobserved heterogeneity term ¾i will
be assumed to be drawn from a common probability distribution with L support points. The
distribution and the support points will all be estimated.
The unemployment hazard rate in the model is given by ¹(¸s) and is directly determined by the
worker's search intensity choice. The search intensity choice will be a function of the worker's initial
wealth, her wage, her o®er arrival rate, and via the reduction in wealth over the unemployment
spell, how long she has been unemployed. Finally, the search decision will also depend on all
of the structural model parameters denoted by µ. The search choice is given by s(·;w;¸;t;µ).
All in all, for a given unobserved heterogeneity term ¾i, the probability of observing the tuple
ftij;zij;·ij;wij;Xijg is simply the probability of an arrival of an o®er in week tij and no arrivals
prior to this:
Lij (µ;¯;¾i) = ¹
¡







¸ij (¯;¾i) ¢ s(·ij;wij;¸ij (¯;¾i);t;µ)
¢¤
:
6In the estimation, it is simply assumed that the wealth level at the outset of the unemployment spell is equal
to the wealth level at the beginning of the year of the spell. Ideally, based on the model one can attempt to adjust
the wealth holding according to the week of the year the spell actually starts in order to more precisely capture the
wealth holdings at the beginning of the spell. But simulations of the model suggest that this will result in very minor
adjustments to the wealth holdings and consequently the procedure is not likely to a®ect the results in any signi¯cant
way.
7Both spouse's income as well as the number of children are included in X: Ideally, these characteristics should enter
via the budget constraint but this will add another dimension of heterogeneity to the estimation. While this is not
conceptually hard, it pushes the computational requirements beyond what is currently feasible. The characteristics
are included in the o®er arrival rate in an attempt to also control for this dimension of observed heterogeneity.













The estimates of (µ;¯) are found via basic maximum likelihood estimation, that is:
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One cannot obtain a closed form solution for s(¢). Thus, for each parameter choice one must
numerically solve the model and evaluate the likelihood function based on the new policy functions.
The details of the numerical issues are described in the appendix.
3.1 Data
The data used in the estimation below were generously made available by Centre for Labour Market
and Social Research in º Arhus, Denmark. The dataset follows 0:5% of the Danish population on a
weekly basis from 1980 through 1994 recording basic information on each individual's employment
status. The data are then merged with individual speci¯c information which includes ¯nancial data
from the Danish tax authorities. In particular, this includes information on individual earnings and
wealth holdings where the wealth measure includes all assets as well as liabilities except pension
savings.8 The tax ¯lings also provide information on any income stemming from other family
members. Other databases provide information on the level of education of the worker, the amount
of work experience, age and gender of the worker, the number of children the worker cares for, etc.
A dataset is then constructed where the basic observation is an unemployment spell. For each
spell, the length and the worker ID of the spell is recorded, whether the length is right censored,
the level of wealth at the beginning of the spell, the year in which the spell started, the wage of the
worker and other worker characteristics. In general, all worker characteristics are observed only on
8Wealth data were collected as a basis for the Danish wealth tax that was in e®ect through 1996. The wealth tax
only taxed wealth holdings above a very large threashold which happens to be well above the upper censoring bound
on wealth. Thus, one need not worry that the wealth measure underestimates wealth holdings due to tax avoidance
incentives. Gross asset and liability observations are censored above 1.1 mio DKK (in°ation adjusted indexed to 1990
DKK) by Statistics Denmark due to anonymity considerations.
11Table 1: Summary Statistics
Variable Minimum Maximum Mean Standard
Deviation
Spell duration 3.00 52.00 16.16 13.94
Spells per worker 1.00 32.00 7.05 5.02
Years of education 9.00 18.00 11.99 2.64
Female 0.00 1.00 0.47 0.50
Spouse's yearly income 0.00 1,046,000.00 159,760.00 137,138.00
Number of children 0.00 12.00 1.66 1.88
Age 18.00 66.00 42.51 8.86
Upper management 0.00 1.00 0.15 0.35
Lower management 0.00 1.00 0.21 0.40
Salaried worker 0.00 1.00 0.29 0.45
Skilled worker 0.00 1.00 0.12 0.32
Hourly wage 85.36 443.99 144.32 49.29
Owner of real estate 0.00 1.00 0.53 0.50
Net wealth -1,046,000.00 1,046,000.00 115,313.00 307,580.00
N=12,865
All income and wealth amounts are in 1994 DKK.
a yearly basis while the employment status is observed weekly. Multiple worker spells are quite
common which will be very useful in dealing with issues of unobserved heterogeneity. The data are
summarized in table 1.
All spell lengths greater than 52 weeks have been censored at 52 weeks and all spells with
durations below 3 weeks have been ignored in that they provide only noise. Most of these spells
are either vacations or spells that do not represent unemployed search but rather a brief spell of
non-employment associated with a job-to-job switch. Estimations were run in which the short spells
were included. The point estimates did not change appreciably but variance increased. Seasonal
and other types of temporary layo®s where the worker returns to her previous employer after a
relatively brief period of time have also been eliminated from the data. The ¯nal data set consists
of a total of 12;865 spells.
The Danish bene¯t system provides a constant 90% replacement rate up to an absolute upper
bound. The upper bound happens to be set so that bene¯ts are constrained at the upper bound for
all wage earners except for those at the very lower end of the wage distribution. Thus, the bene¯t
level observation is constant for the vast majority of the observations. However, for observations
with wages below the 4th percentile of the wage distribution in the data, bene¯ts are 90% of the
12wage observation. The estimation of the model does not allow for heterogeneity in the bene¯t
level observation. Lifting this restriction implies that one must allow for yet another dimension
of heterogeneity in the estimation and is currently not computationally feasible. To maintain
the correct replacement rate for the observations with wages below the 4th percentile, the wage
observations are censored at the 4th percentile. The wage measure has been censored at the upper
99.5 percentile level to deal with possible measurement error as well as for practical reasons to limit
the wage span that the model must be solved for.
The model allows for a full wage distribution for the economy but assumes that each worker
faces a single wage. All higher moments of the wage distribution are assumed to be zero. The
¯rst moment of the individual's wage o®er distribution can be identi¯ed in various ways. In the
estimation below, the wage measure is simply the realized wage of the year prior to the year of the
unemployment spell. Observationally, it is clear that there is a noise component to the realized wage.
As such, one can attempt to reduce the noise by taking an average over several wage observations
around the year of the unemployment spell in question. Alternatively, one can adopt the approach
that the worker's expectation about the future wage is best approximated by the realized wage
in the new job. Furthermore, one can attempt to predict the wage via a wage regression. This
approach has the disadvantage that wage regressions typically only explain roughly 25-30% of the
observed wage variation. All of these choices are consistent with the model in that it is assumed
that the wage of the particular worker is ¯xed. Reduced form estimations were performed on all of
the di®erent wage measures mentioned and they all yield the same qualitative results.
3.2 Estimation Results
The estimation is performed given a constant relative risk aversion speci¯cation of consumption,
u(c) = c1¡®=(1 ¡ ®): Search cost are assumed to be exponential, e(s) = As°; where A is not
separately identi¯ed from the level of the o®er arrival rate ¸ and is set to be numerically convenient,
A = 100. The period length in the simulation is set at one week. This is in part driven by the
weekly observation frequency in data. But also, it allows a less restricted use of the search intensity
decision because it is not assumed to be ¯xed for long periods of time. The interest rate r is set
an annual rate of 5%, that is r = (1:05)
1=52 ¡ 1: The subjective discount rate is set at the slightly
higher annual rate of 5:1%; which ensures the existence of an upper bound on the ergodic wealth





Years of Education ¡0:0052 0:0078
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¤Signi¯cantly di®erent from zero at the 1% level.
distribution. The job destruction rate is set at ± = 1=243 which ¯ts the average employment spell
in the data of 243 weeks. The estimate is taken from Rosholm and Svarer (2000) who estimate the
parameter on the same basic data as in this paper. The bene¯t level is normalized at b = :1. All
income and wealth observations are adjusted according to this normalization. Finally, the lower
wealth bound is set at the minimum observed wealth level k = ¡41:3. The upper bound is set
above the upper bound on the ergodic wealth distribution which is also well above the maximum
observed wealth distribution.
The identi¯cation strategy does not identify the di®erence between r and ½. This parameter
relationship primarily a®ects savings behavior and has little impact on search behavior. Theoret-
ically, one would expect that the the (r;½) relationship will a®ect the duration dependence of the
search choice because the rate of dissaving during unemployment is sensitive to changes in (r;½).
14But given that most workers are not liquidity constrained, the changes in rates of dissaving are not
large enough to generate noticeable e®ects on duration dependence.
It is very reasonable to expect that there is heterogeneity in ±. Identifying heterogeneity in ±
can be done in much the same way as it is done for ¸. However, the extension requires that data
are expanded to include employment spells.
Identi¯cation of a common lower wealth bound has not been feasible. The wealth bound must
lie at or below the minimum wealth observation in the data. Thus, identi¯cation will be driven by
the very few observations with very low wealth levels. The vast majority of the spell observations
are characterized by wealth levels such that a change in the lower wealth bound below the minimum
wealth observation has no e®ect on worker behavior. Consequently, the sensitivity of the search
decision with respect to wealth is purely driven by the utility function parameters.
All in all, the structural estimation determines (®;°;¯;G) where ¯ includes 26 parameters.
The estimates of all parameters except the yearly dummy parameters are given in table 2 . The
yearly dummy estimates are displayed in ¯gure 1. The number of support points in G is set at
L = 4. Ideally, one would prefer to continue to add support points until additional points no longer
improve the estimation. However, estimating the model is computationally very expensive and
experimentation with the number of support points in G is not currently feasible.9
Generally, the signs and statistical signi¯cance of the ¯ coe±cients are similar to the reduced
form estimates in Lentz and Tran½s (2002). It is seen that the signs of the age and education
e®ects are negative. Similar results are found in the literature such as Meyer (1990).
While the risk aversion estimate is well within the range of previous such estimates, it is worth
noting that the estimate does imply signi¯cantly more risk averse workers than the typical assump-
tion of log-utility in the optimal unemployment insurance literature. Furthermore, the search cost
function estimate implies that the search behavior of Danish workers is relatively insensitive to
changes in incentives. This is consistent with the ¯ndings on Danish labor supply elasticities in
Frederiksen, Graversen, and Smith (2001).
Turning to the e®ect of occupation, it is seen none of these estimates are signi¯cantly di®erent
from zero. The left out occupational category is unskilled workers. Thus, no occupational category
9Lentz and Tran½s (2002) estimate a proportional hazard model with unobserved heterogeneity on the same data
as in this paper. In this estimation, G was estimated to have 4 support points. Adding more points beyond this did
not improve the estimation.
15has signi¯cantly di®erent o®er arrival rates relative to unskilled workers. Of course, once one
controls for wages it is indeed not clear from a theoretical perspective what the e®ect of occupation
should be on the hazard rate.
It is interesting to note the gender di®erence associated with spousal income. A woman seems
to experience longer unemployment spells the higher her spouse's income. This is consistent with
the argument that the household insures the worker and further emphasizes the point that one
should ideally include spouse's income in the budget constraint rather than in the o®er arrival rate.
However, the e®ect on men is directly the opposite! Furthermore, the e®ects are statistically very
strong.
A dummy for whether the worker owns real estate has also been included in the analysis. One
might suspect that if a signi¯cant portion of the worker's wealth is tied up in real estate and if the
credit markets are imperfect in the sense that workers cannot borrow against real estate holdings,
then this should reduce the insurance value of the wealth holdings. If this is the case, one should
expect a positive sign on the dummy variable. Alternatively, one might suspect that moving costs
are signi¯cantly higher if the worker is a homeowner. As such, homeowners may face lower o®er
arrival rates due to less geographical mobility. As it turns out, the sign is negative suggesting that
the latter e®ect dominates. The e®ect is not signi¯cantly di®erent from zero, though.10
The yearly dummy e®ects in ¯gure 1 very clearly capture the e®ect of the business cycle on
the o®er arrival rate. In times of recession, the o®er arrival rate is low and the unemployment
rate is high and vice versa. Furthermore, one can clearly detect a lead e®ect in the o®er arrival
rate of about one year. This is consistent with ¯ndings in Abowd, Corbel, and Kramarz (1999)
that employers primarily adjust ¯rm size via the hiring decision. Thus, in the face of diminished
demand and therefore lower labor demand, ¯rms lower the hiring rate which results in a lower o®er
arrival rate which with a lag is then eventually re°ected in more unemployment as the relatively
una®ected °ow into the unemployment pool is now exceeding the lower °ow out.
The utility function estimates primarily a®ect the wealth and wage e®ects on the hazard rate. In
¯gure 2, the estimated unemployment hazard is shown for an average o®er arrival rate (¸ = :09826).
10Again, like in the case of spousal income and the number of children variables, one may have reservations about
including the real estate dummy in the o®er arrival rate given that the e®ect on the hazard rate should be a behavior
driven phenomenon and consequently it should be included elsewhere in the model. However, given that this is
infeasible it is on the other hand desirable to control for as much observed heterogeneity as possible in order to
capture the wealth and wage e®ects as precisely as possible.
16Figure 1: Yearly Dummy Estimates and the Unemployment Rate.















Note: Yearly dummy estimates and 95% con¯dence bounds drawn on left axis with solid lines. The unemployment
rate is drawn on the right axis with a dashed line.
The wealth and wage e®ects are shown in isolation in ¯gure 3 where reduced form estimates of the
wealth and wage e®ects are also included with dashed lines. The reduced form estimates are based
on a standard proportional hazard model and are discussed in detail in Lentz and Tran½s (2002).
The model imposes a negative wealth e®ect on the hazard. Thus, if a positive relationship
exists in the data the best the model can do is to eliminate the wealth e®ect altogether. However,
from the reduced form estimation in Lentz and Tran½s (2002), it is known that there is an overall
positive relationship between duration and wealth in the data and the structural model successfully
captures this relationship. The fundamental positive relationship between wealth and unemploy-
ment duration is also found on Dutch and French data in Bloemen and Stancanelli (2001) and
Algan, Ch¶ eron, Hairault, and Langot (2001), respectively.
Reduced form estimations in Lentz and Tran½s (2002) con¯rm that the relationship between
unemployment duration and wages is non-monotone. This is done under a wide variety of wage
measures. It is seen that the structural estimation captures this relationship as well: For workers
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with su±ciently high wealth levels, the income e®ect associated with an increase in the permanent
wage eventually drives down the search choice. At low wealth levels, the estimated unemployment
hazard rate is monotonically increasing, though. This is driven by the model that dictates a
monotone wage e®ect for the very low wealth levels.
It is important to note that the estimated wage e®ect need not be non-monotone. This is a
result of the basic relationships in the data. In order to get this result, one must have a su±cient
degree of risk aversion. For a lower degree of risk aversion one will ¯nd that the wage e®ect becomes
monotone for all wealth levels. Consequently the wage relationship is an important identi¯er of the
degree of risk aversion in the model.
In general, ® and ° are identi¯ed by both the wage and the wealth e®ects. A higher ® will tend
to introduce a non-monotone wage relationship but also a stronger wealth e®ect. The estimate in
the analysis is determined by both a positive relationship between spell duration and wealth and the
non-monotone relationship between spell duration and the wage of the worker. ° primarily a®ects
18Figure 3: Estimated Unemployment Hazard Rate (other 2 dimensions ¯xed)
















Note: Model estimated hazard rate drawn in solid pen. Reduced form estimates based on a standard proportional
hazard model are drawn in dashed line.
the magnitude of the response to changes in wealth and wages. Data show that the magnitude
of the change in the observed unemployment hazard rate over the wealth and wage dimensions is
relatively small which consequently yields a high ° estimate.
Turning to the duration dependence of the search decision, it is seen in ¯gure 4, that the
estimated e®ect is rather small. For an average individual who holds wealth corresponding to the
median of the wealth distribution, the hazard rate changes only from 6.70% to 6.98% over a 10 year
long unemployment spell. In the ¯rst year, the hazard rate rises only to 6.73% implying a change
of only 0.03 percentage points. This re°ects an estimated wealth change that is not very big as well
as the high ° estimate. Had one assumed a lower interest rate, the dissaving would be stronger
and consequently the duration dependence would be stronger. However, the high ° estimate does
greatly limit how large the e®ect can be.
One can of course choose (k;w;¸) combinations where the duration dependence is more pro-
nounced but the basic message here is that one should not expect the wealth e®ect to play a
dominant role in empirical duration dependence studies. And in fact, the general result in these
studies is that the overall duration dependence (as seen in the baseline hazard) is either zero or
negative suggesting the impact of other stronger e®ects such as loss of skills, discouragement, ex-
hausting the pool of potential jobs and the like. A similar result is shown in Lentz and Tran½s
19Figure 4: Estimated Hazard Rate at Di®erent Positions in the Wealth Distribution.











(2002), where the wealth e®ect on spell duration is shown to be statistically signi¯cantly negative
but small in absolute terms.
4 Optimal Unemployment Bene¯t Insurance
This section will study the optimal provision of unemployment bene¯t insurance in the estimated
model. The bene¯t policy is constrained to a ¯xed level of bene¯ts b and a ¯xed proportional
income tax ¿. Bene¯ts are assumed to last inde¯nitely and the worker is always eligible to receive
them. Thus, I will be disregarding the issue of the optimal design of a bene¯t pro¯le over unem-
ployment duration. These much more complicated bene¯t pro¯les are quite likely not politically
implementable. Furthermore, the intuition emerging from Werning's (2002) and Kocherlakota's
(2003) studies suggests that constraining the bene¯t path to be constant in a model with unob-
servable savings may in fact not be far from the optimally designed path. The isolated question
of optimal bene¯t design over duration has been studied in job search models without savings in
Shavell and Weiss (1979) and Hopenhayn and Nicolini (1997). Here, it is shown that the cost min-
imizing pro¯le is decreasing in unemployment duration. Werning (2002) and Kocherlakota (2003)
20study the same optimal design problem with savings and establish that once the direct link between
income and consumption is broken, the optimal income path during unemployment may very well
be constant, which is the result in Kocherlakota (2003), or even in some cases upward sloping as is
shown in Werning (2002).11
Throughout the optimal policy analysis in this section, it will be assumed that k is independent
of the unemployment insurance system. The lower bound has to be consistent with non-negativity
of consumption for all UI schemes. The strictest condition on the lower wealth bound is therefore
imposed by the b = 0 UI scheme which implies that k = 0. The independence condition on the
lower wealth bound is a useful simpli¯cation in what follows. But it also allows a focus on the
e®ects of the UI system in isolation from any changes in the credit conditions. In future research
one can contrast the results below to results in which the lower wealth bound is UI dependent to
quantify the e®ects of UI via this channel.
4.1 Individual Unemployment Bene¯t Insurance Schemes
In this section, I will study optimal unemployment bene¯t provision from an individual level taking
the current state as well as the type of the worker as an initial condition. The income tax rate is
set such that the worker's expected future stream of discounted tax payments exactly balance her
expected future stream of discounted bene¯t receipts. In this sense, the system can be said to be
actuarially fair. It is assumed that the worker can commit to this scheme and that it will remain
¯xed even as the state of the worker changes. This, in spite of the fact that there are cases where
both parties of the contract would happily dissolve it to sign a new one. However, the design of a
more sophisticated contract is beyond the scope of this paper.
The individually optimal unemployment bene¯t system is found by taking the state of an
individual worker as given and determine the preferred replacement rate subject to the constraint
that the discounted tax and bene¯t streams balance each other. The design problem can be stated
11The discussion in Kocherlakota (2003) shows that the optimal design problem with unobservable savings is still
very much an open question and that current methodology may in fact not allow computationally feasible strategies
to compute optimal bene¯t paths even in the case of no state or type heterogeneity. Needless to say, once one allows
for state or type heterogeneity, the problem does not become any easier.
21Table 3: Optimal Individual Bene¯t Schemes (¸ = :0983).
Employed
Replacement Rate Income Tax Rate
k = 0 k = 10 k = 100 k = 0 k = 10 k = 100
w = :20 68:0 47:1 28:7 4:4 3:0 1:9
w = :40 68:2 56:1 32:9 4:6 3:8 2:3
Unemployed
Replacement Rate Income Tax Rate
k = 0 k = 10 k = 100 k = 0 k = 10 k = 100
w = :20 75:5 48:1 27:3 6:0 3:8 2:3
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where ke (k); ku (k) and s(k) are the policy functions associated with the maximization problems.
The budget constraint, Bi(k) = 0, associated with the unemployment bene¯t scheme is non-trivial.
It takes into account the worker's behavior under the given insurance scheme and therefore makes
the worker internalize the moral hazard problem.
The optimal unemployment bene¯t schemes for the estimated model are shown in table 3 as a
function of state and type. The scheme is represented by a replacement rate b=w and the associated
income tax rate that balances the budget. In general, the preferred replacement rate is a negative
function of wealth. This re°ects the fact that a wealthier worker is already well insured against
income °uctuations via her wealth. Therefore, a wealthy worker can avoid the distortive e®ects of
unemployment bene¯ts without giving up much insurance.
An unemployed worker generally prefers more insurance than an employed worker which is not
22surprising since the contingency that the insurance is supposed to cover has already occurred in
this case. However, for a given wealth level and replacement rate an unemployed worker faces a
higher tax rate than an employed worker because bene¯ts are being paid immediately. Thus, once
the importance of the insurance aspect fades for higher wealth levels, the cost e®ect may actually
drive the unemployed worker to demand slightly less insurance than the employed. It is important
to keep in mind that a given wealth level corresponds to fewer weeks worth of consumption for a
high wage type than a low wage type. Thus, a given wealth level has less insurance value for a
higher wage. This explains why high wage types want more insurance than low wage types for a
given wealth level.
Given the obvious link between the degree of risk aversion and the need for insurance against
income °uctuations, one may wonder about the sensitivity of the results to the particular estimate in
the paper. Table 4 presents a sensitivity study that varies the curvature of the utility of consumption
function and the curvature of the search cost function. The replacement rates are calculated for
a wage w = 0:2 which is the median wage. The results in table 4 are found by setting the utility
function parameters at a particular set of values and then re-estimate the model subject to the
utility function parameterization in question. The optimal replacement rates are then calculated
for the average o®er arrival rate of the new estimation. This way the unemployment risk is held
constant over changes in the utility function parameters and the changes in the optimal replacement
rates consequently only re°ect the changes in the utility function parameterization.
The middle row of table 4 displays the sensitivity of the results in table 3 to a change in the
curvature of the search cost function. In this case, the search cost function has been assumed to be
quadratic and as such, the moral hazard problem is now signi¯cantly more pronounced. And indeed,
the optimal replacement rates are signi¯cantly lower because an increase in the unemployment
bene¯ts has a greater impact on the worker's search choice. The sensitivity of optimal UI to the
moral hazard dimension of the problem is also analyzed in Hansen and Imrohoroglu (1992) where a
similar type of sensitivity is found. The top and bottom rows then vary the degree of risk aversion.
Generally, one ¯nds the natural result that less risk averse workers prefer less insurance.
Overall, one ¯nds high optimal replacement rates for the estimated model. In fact, the op-
timal replacement rates are within the range of the high actual replacement rates in the Danish
unemployment bene¯t system. This is primarily due to the high estimate of the curvature of the
23Table 4: Sensitivity Study (w = 0:2).
Employed
Replacement Rate Income Tax Rate
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Unemployed
Replacement Rate Income Tax Rate




















A 54:28 17:55 6:70 3:56 0:95 0:53
search cost function. The high degree of curvature implies that the worker's search choice is quite
insensitive to changes in incentives. Thus, one can o®er a high level of insurance without worrying
that search choices are being distorted. As was seen in table 4, the optimal replacement rates drop
dramatically for higher levels of moral hazard.
It is also seen that the preferred replacement rates are insensitive to the wage of the worker.
This result suggests that an optimal bene¯t system should o®er a constant replacement rate to all
wage types. This is in stark contrast to the current Danish system in which the replacement rate
is highly wage sensitive. Thus at a replacement rate of 90%, Danish low wage workers seem to be
over-insured and with replacement rates as low or even lower than 10%, high wage workers look to
be under-insured.
244.2 Group Wide Unemployment Bene¯t Insurance Schemes
After the exploration of optimal individual unemployment bene¯t insurance schemes in the previous
section, the analysis now turns to optimal group wide unemployment bene¯t insurance. I determine
optimal replacement rates for groups of identical type workers according to a utilitarian social
welfare criterion. Thus, the wage and o®er arrival rate are identical for all workers in the insurance
scheme but the state varies according to each individual's employment history. The bene¯t scheme
is constrained to satisfy inter-temporal budget balance.
An important aspect of the analysis is that it includes full transitional dynamics from the initial
state distribution of the group to the steady state of the new bene¯t scheme. Once wealth is part
of the analysis, transitional dynamics must be included so as to avoid a serious downward bias in
the optimal replacement rate results that would otherwise occur if one were to simply maximize
social welfare across steady states. It is assumed that the social planner can commit to the bene¯t
scheme which is assumed to be constant even as the group's state distribution is changing.
Consider a group of identical type workers who face an unemployment insurance scheme char-
acterized by a constant bene¯t level b and a proportional income tax ¿. The worker's problem is
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distribution for the group. (6) and (7) together induce a mapping ªb;¿ that maps a given state
distribution into next period's state distribution according to the policy functions and parame-
ters of the model. Given an initial state distribution ', the state distribution density for state









where P (x;yjb;¿) is the transition function probability of moving from state x into state y given
the unemployment bene¯t scheme (b;¿). The fact that ªb;¿ depends on other parameters than
(b;¿) has been suppressed for notational convenience.
Denote by '0 (¢) the initial state distribution of the group. Employing a simple utilitarian
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25where £ is a set that restricts the choice of bene¯t scheme. By stating the welfare criterion in terms
of value functions, one correctly takes into account the dynamic adjustment that each individual
will face given the current state of the individual and subject to the new bene¯t-tax scheme.
In the following, £ will be de¯ned as the set of inter-temporally balanced bene¯t-tax schemes,
£ =
(
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The set of balanced budgets is found by Monte Carlo methods. Clearly, for a given bene¯t level
there may be multiple tax rates that solve the budget problem. The one to maximize welfare is
always the minimum tax rate.
Unlike in the previous section, the individual preference for insurance under this scheme will be
a®ected by subsidization issues. It is clear that depending on the current state of the worker, the
individual worker's discounted stream of bene¯ts may not exactly balance her discounted stream of
taxes. In particular, currently employed workers will expect to be subsidizing the currently unem-
ployed and perhaps more surprising, the currently poor workers will be subsidizing the currently
wealthy because the wealthy workers have lower unemployment hazard rates.
Figure 5 shows a set of optimal replacement rates calculated for the group of w = 0:2 type
workers. The horizontal axis represents the initial state of the economy. It is stated in terms of a
replacement rate. The initial state is the steady state associated with the replacement rate and the
tax rate that balances the steady state budget for the given replacement rate. The vertical axis is
the optimal replacement rate given the initial state distribution.
Replacement rates are found for the estimated curvature of the search cost function as well as
the case of quadratic search costs (° = 2). The o®er arrival rate ¸ is set at the average estimated
level for each given search cost speci¯cation. Thus, for the case where ° = 13:36 the base o®er
arrival rate is set at ¸ = :098 whereas the case where ° = 2;the base o®er arrival rate is set at
¸ = :45. Furthermore, the sensitivity of the replacement rates to the interest rate is also highlighted
by calculating optimal replacement rates for annual interest rates of ¯ve and zero percent. The
subjective discount rate is constant at an annual rate of 5.1%.
26Figure 5: Optimal Group Wide Replacement Rates.



















































Note: The curves show the solution to the optimal utilitarian social planner problem set out in (8) subject to the
inter-temporal budget constraint (9). The initial state '
0 is the balanced budget steady state distribution associated
with the initial replacement rate. All curves are determined for the group of w = 0:2 type workers.
Generally, the optimal replacement rate is increasing in the initial replacement rate which is due
to the fact that workers hold less wealth in higher replacement rate initial states. Thus, given the
lower initial wealth holdings, workers have a higher preference for unemployment bene¯t insurance.
The gap between the interest rate and the subjective discount rate is e®ectively the cost of
using savings as a self-insurance instrument. While previous studies of optimal unemployment
insurance have noted the importance of whether or not workers have access to savings as a self-
insurance instrument, the cost of using savings as insurance has not been noted. It is seen that the
optimal replacement rates are highly sensitive to the interest rate assumption. At zero percent, self-
insurance is expensive and workers substitute into unemployment bene¯ts. As the interest rate is
increased to almost equal the subjective discount rate, optimal replacement rates drop dramatically.
The intersect between the replacement rate curve and the diagonal has special signi¯cance.
Here, the social planner does not wish to change the initial state. Based on this point, the optimal
replacement rate for the estimated model is 43%. If the interest rate were zero, the estimated
27replacement rate would be 82%. It is worth noting that these replacement rates are in fact not too
di®erent from the observed replacement rates in Denmark. For a quadratic search cost function,
the estimated replacement rate is as low as 14%. In this particular case, the use of self-insurance
is su±ciently cheap and there is enough moral hazard associated with the use of unemployment
bene¯ts that workers choose to rely almost exclusively on self-insurance.
Previous literature on optimal unemployment insurance typically determines optimal bene¯t
policy by maximizing the social welfare criterion across steady states associated with di®erent
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b;¿ is the ergodic state distribution for the bene¯t scheme characterized by (b;¿). ¿¤ (b) is
the minimum tax rate that balances the steady state budget.
In the case where savings are included in the analysis, simple maximization across steady states
will introduce a signi¯cant downward bias in the results. To illustrate the bias, the replacement rate
that maximizes (10) is found to be 45% in the quadratic search cost case and given a zero interest
rate. As seen in ¯gure 5, this compares to a 57% optimal replacement rate when transitional
dynamics are included. In the 5% interest rate case, the replacement rate that maximizes (10)
was found to be less than 0.5%. Including transitional dynamics for this case yields an optimal
replacement rate of 14%.
The bias arises because the steady state wealth distribution is a function of the bene¯t scheme.
Lower bene¯ts result in higher wealth holdings. For interest rates close to the subjective discount
rate, the sensitivity of the wealth distribution to the bene¯t level can be so high that lowering
bene¯ts while holding taxes ¯xed can even increase the steady state social welfare criterion! While
any worker is obviously worse o® for a given wealth level, the steady state wealth distribution
can increase so much that the evaluation of worker welfare at the higher wealth levels more than
o®sets the poorer insurance. The erroneous conclusion that overall worker welfare has increased as
a result of the lower bene¯t level is based on the simple fact that the consumption cost of building
up the higher wealth levels in the new steady state has been ignored. These results emphasize the
28importance of including transitional dynamics in the analysis.12
One can employ other aggregation mechanisms. A majority voting game is one such mecha-
nism. Here, the median voter decides on the replacement rate for the group subject to the budget
constraint (9). The median voter preference is determined by establishing a replacement rate pref-
erence for each possible worker state and then based on the given state distribution one obtains the
replacement rate preference distribution for the group. A steady state majority voting equilibrium
is de¯ned as a steady state in which the median voter prefers exactly the existing replacement rate.
One can appeal to the median voter theorem because the individual replacement rate preference
turns out to be single peaked. The analysis is an interesting complementary analysis to Wright
(1986). Here, exogenously given heterogeneity over re-employment probabilities generates a pref-
erence distribution over unemployment bene¯t levels. This is similar to the model at hand but in
this case the heterogeneity is generated endogenously.
The results of this type of analysis are quite similar to the outcome of the utilitarian aggregation
scheme.13 The latter does yield somewhat higher replacement rate results since it places more weight
on the poorly insured due to their very low levels of utility. However, it is important to keep in mind
that the majority voting scheme as it has been presented here su®ers from the important limitation
that it assumes commitment to the chosen unemployment bene¯t level. A more satisfactory but
also considerably more complicated analysis will allow for repeated voting.
5 Conclusion
This paper has estimated a job search model with savings and subsequently determined optimal
bene¯t policy for the estimated model. Depending on the cost of self-insuring via savings, the
optimal replacement rate ranges between 43% and 82%. If savings carry a low return relative to
the subjective discount rate, self-insurance via savings will be expensive and consequently workers
will want to rely more on unemployment bene¯t insurance to guard against income °uctuations.
The estimation strategy relates observed unemployment durations to the model implied unem-
ployment hazard rate which the worker can a®ect by the choice of search intensity. Data show a
positive relationship between wealth holdings and unemployment duration which the model suc-
12A similar point is emphasized in Joseph and Weitzenblum (2000)
13The details of the analysis and the results are not presented here but can be obtained from the author by request.
29cessfully captures as a result of worker search behavior; wealthier workers search less. The U-shaped
relationship between unemployment duration and the worker's wage is also successfully captured as
a straightforward search choice response to variation in wage expectations in a search model with
savings. The savings aspect is important in this respect since search models without savings cannot
generate a non-monotone relationship between the search choice and the wage. The relationships
between unemployment duration and other worker characteristics are explained as a combination
of a market e®ect captured in the individual o®er arrival function parameter ¸ and the worker's
search response to the market e®ect.
The estimated utility of consumption function implies a constant relative risk aversion coe±cient
of 2:21 and the estimated search cost function displays a high degree of curvature. While Danish
workers respond to changes in economic incentives in ways that are consistent with the model,
the high degree of curvature in the estimated search cost function re°ects that the unemployment
hazard rate response is small in magnitude. As a consequence, while the model does imply positive
duration dependence of the unemployment hazard rate, the e®ect will be so small in magnitude
that it will likely be dominated by other e®ects. Indeed, most duration dependence analyses show
a slightly negative or zero trend in the baseline hazard rate over unemployment duration.
The determination of optimal unemployment bene¯t level policy relies purely on a trade-o®
between providing insurance against consumption °uctuation and the moral hazard problem asso-
ciated with reducing the worker's incentives to search back into employment. The high degree of
curvature in the estimated search cost function implies a low level of moral hazard in the model
and consequently yields relatively high replacement rate results even though workers have access
to self-insurance via savings. For higher levels of moral hazard, the paper showed that the optimal
replacement rate drops as low as 14% as workers switch into savings as their main insurance vehicle.
The analysis has disregarded life cycle issues. In particular, it is possible that steady state
wealth holdings could be greater if the model were to allow for life cycle savings in addition to
the precautionary savings considered so far, and consequently that optimal unemployment bene¯t
levels would be lower. Allowing for positive higher order moments in the wage o®er distribution
could have a similar type of e®ect in that workers may increase their savings in an attempt to insure
against the added income uncertainty. However, in contrast to the very temporary nature of the
income shock associated with unemployment, the income shock associated with uncertainty about
30the wage earned on the job is much more permanent in nature. Savings are not a particularly
e®ective insurance instrument against permanent income shocks and as such, it is not obvious
whether this source of added income uncertainty would a®ect precautionary savings signi¯cantly.
The model analysis is partial. In particular, each individual's wage o®er distribution is exoge-
nously given which closes a potentially important equilibrium feedback channel for policies such as
those pertaining to unemployment bene¯ts. Extensions of the analysis to general equilibrium job
search models with wage dispersion is a particularly interesting avenue of future research. One such
example is Acemoglu and Shimer (1999) where e±ciency aspects of unemployment bene¯t policy
that arise in this setup are highlighted.
The policy analysis emphasized the importance of including transitional dynamics in the anal-
ysis. Failure to do so, will introduce a signi¯cant downward bias in the results because the wealth
distribution in the economy depends on the bene¯t scheme. A lower level of bene¯ts will result in
greater wealth holdings in steady state. By not including transitional dynamics in the analysis one
will be ignoring the consumption cost associated with building these greater wealth holdings and
consequently lower bene¯t levels look more attractive. The analysis showed that the downward
bias can be quite large even in the case where the interest rate is zero and the steady state wealth
distribution is less sensitive to the bene¯t scheme.
31A Appendix
A.1 Policy Function Characterization
In the model (1)-(2), wealth e®ects can enter via two sources; the utility function speci¯cation
and the lower wealth bound. The lower wealth bound will in isolation unambiguously imply more
search the closer a worker gets to the bound since the worker is running out of insurance and
the state of unemployment is getting harder and harder to face. Turning to the utility function
speci¯cation, special attention should be given to the assumptions made about the relationship
between search costs and the consumption level. If one assumes separability as is the case in this
paper, wealth will a®ect the search intensity choice negatively for any concave choice of u(¢) and
any convex choice of e(¢). If one allows the level of consumption to a®ect the marginal utility cost of
search, depending on the exact utility speci¯cation one can get non-monotone relationships between
wealth and the search decision or one can entirely eliminate any wealth e®ect whatsoever. For an
example of the latter in a search intensity model, see Flemming (1978). When the search choice is a
reservation wage, the marginal utility costs and gains associated with changing the search decision
are automatically tied to the consumption level and the degree of absolute risk aversion becomes
the deciding factor. Danforth (1979) and Acemoglu and Shimer (1999) are examples of this.
Generally, the di®erence between u(ce (k))and u(cu (k)) is reduced as wealth increases. The
utility di®erence falls because at higher wealth levels the worker consumes more and smooths
consumption better. Consequently, there are fewer incentives to search at higher wealth levels.
If search costs are una®ected by wealth holdings it directly follows that the search choice must
depend negatively on wealth because gains to search are decreasing and the costs are una®ected. If
costs are also a®ected by wealth holdings, the search choice can become a non-monotone function
of wealth.
One cannot directly establish concavity of the value functions in the model which complicates
the analysis considerably. Lentz and Tran½s (2002) show that concavity can be obtained by the
introduction of a simple wealth lottery. 14 Once concavity has been established one can show that
it must be that ce (k) > cu (k) for all k which provides the fundamental part of the characterization
14The wealth lottery in question has zero expected value and will only be accepted if there is a convexity in the
value function. Intuitively, the lottery has the e®ect of \smoothing" out any convexities in the value function by
making it linear over the intervals where it would otherwise be convex.
32of the relationship between search and wealth. In the paper, any such su±cient condition have
not been made. However, the possibility of convexities in the value functions never seems to be an
issue in numerical simulations of the model. All simulations have produced globally concave value
functions.
Another relationship of interest is the one between the search decision and the income of the
worker. In a job search model with no consumption smoothing, the e®ect is trivial: A higher wage
or a lower bene¯t level will either increase consumption when employed or lower the consumption
when unemployed while the other consumption level remains unchanged. This will unambiguously
make the worker search harder. However, when the worker has access to savings, matters are more
complex. In this case, one must consider both a substitution and income e®ect. The substitution
e®ect dictates that the worker search harder when the worker's permanent wage increases. This
is due to the fact that the di®erence between consumption when unemployed and consumption
when employed has increased. However, the income e®ect of an increased permanent wage implies
that both consumption levels increase which has the isolated e®ect of lowering the utility di®erence
between the two paths and consequently a lower search choice. Thus, the e®ect on the search
choice from an increase in future wages is ambiguous except when wealth is at the lower bound
and there cannot be an income e®ect on the consumption level when unemployed. In this case, no
consumption smoothing is possible and a higher wage will unambiguously lead to a higher search
choice.
It is tempting to extend the above ambiguity to the case of changes in bene¯ts. However in
this case, the two e®ects mentioned point in the same direction. An unemployed worker who faces
lower bene¯ts will see both an increased di®erence between ce and cu as well as a lower cu. The
intuitive arguments above are summarized in corollary 1.
Proposition 1 In the model described by (1) and (2), given concavity of Ve (¢) and Vu (¢) and that









































(1 + ½)e00 (s(k))=¸e¡¸s(k) + ¸[Ve (ku (k)) ¡ Vu (ku (k))]
: (12)
Given concavity of Ve (¢) and Vu (¢) one can show that V 0
e;k (ku (k)) ¡ V 0
u;k (ku (k)) < 0 for all k and
that k0
u;w (k) < 0 and k0
u;b (k) > 0 for all k > k: And ¯nally that k0
u;w (k) = k0
u;b (k) = 0: See Lentz









e;w (k) ¡ V 0





Combining this result with (11), one immediately gets that @s(k)=@w > 0: For k > k; the sign of
V 0
e;w (ku (k)) ¡ V 0
u;w (ku (k)) becomes ambiguous. Simulations suggest that with enough curvature
in u(¢) this term can for su±ciently high wealth and wage levels become negative and imply an
overall negative impact on the search choice from increases in the wage. Turning to the e®ect of
changes in the bene¯t level, using the envelope conditions it follows that:
V 0
e;b (k) =
(1 ¡ ±)V 0





u;b (k) = u0 (cu (k)) +
¹(¸s(k))V 0





u;kb = u00 (cu (k))(1 + r)c0
u;b (k) < 0 as well as V 00
e;kb = u00 (ce (k))(1 + r)c0
e;b (k) < 0 and that
ku (k) < ke (k); it follows that V 0
u;b (ku (k)) > V 0
u;b (ke (k)) and V 0
e;b (ku (k)) > V 0
e;b (ke (k)): Since,
(1)-(2) forms a contraction mapping over a compact state space, it is known that a unique ¯x point
must exist and that if one can show that the mapping maps a set into a subset of itself, then the ¯x
point must lie within that subset. This fact is used to show that the ¯x point must be characterized
by V 0
e;b (k) ¡ V 0
u;b (k) < 0: Assume V 0
e;b (k) ¡ V 0
u;b (k) · 0: From (13) and (14) it follows that:
V 0
e;b (k) ¡ V 0
u;b (k) < (1 ¡ ± ¡ ¹(¸s(k)))
V 0
e;b (ke (k)) ¡ V 0
u;b (ke (k))
1 + ½
¡ u0 (cu (k))
< 0:
Thus, the contraction mapping maps the set of function characterized by V 0
e;b (k)¡V 0
u;b (k) · 0 into
a set of functions characterized by V 0
e;b (k)¡V 0
u;b (k) < 0: Thus, it is proven that it must be that the
34¯x point is characterized by V 0
e;b (k) ¡ V 0
u;b (k) < 0: Combining this with (12), one gets the result





A.2 Numerical Model Solution
The model is solved via value function iteration where a cubic spline projection is used to approxi-
mate the value functions.15 The value function iteration is accelerated by performing a number of
value function iterations for ¯xed policy functions between policy function updates.16 For more on
this see for example Judd (1998).
Denote by ~ Ve (k) and ~ Vu (k) the cubic spline projections that approximate the ¯x point of the
mappings in (1) and (2). Based on the spline projections, one can then evaluate the two relevant
policy function s(k) and ku (k) for any k by simply solving the maximization problem in (2) using
~ Ve (k) and ~ Vu (k).
In order to evaluate the likelihood function (4) for a given µ, one must be able to evaluate the
search intensity choice over 4 dimensions: The wealth level at the outset of the spell, the wage,
the o®er arrival rate and the duration of the spell to date. To this end, the model is ¯rst solved
for each point in the grid fwi;¸jg
M
i;j=1. This amounts to M2 times that one must solve the model.
For each grid point (w;¸), the policy functions are then evaluated on a wealth grid fklg
M
l=1. The
procedure leads to a full evaluation of the search and savings policy functions on the 3-dimensional
grid fki;wj;¸lg
M
i;j;l=1. Interpolation is subsequently performed between the grid points which yields
the continuous approximations to the policy functions denoted by ~ s(k;w;¸) and ~ ku (k;w;¸).
The duration dependence of the search choice is determined via the evolution of the worker's
wealth over the unemployment spell. The wealth level at a particular time during the unemployment
spell is inferred via the observed wealth level at the outset of the spell and then by simple iteration
on ~ ku (¢). Denote the wealth of a worker with initial wealth k; wage w and o®er arrival rate ¸ at
15Discretization methods are in this case impractical given the potentially very wide support of the state space.
The upper bound on the ergodic wealth distribution can be very high when the interest rate is close to the subjective
discount rate. Experimentation suggests that to properly capture the savings decisions via discretization methods,
one will need such a large number of points in the state space that computation times become unacceptable. On the
other hand, projection methods based on cubic splines turn out to be extremely e®ective.
16The expensive part of the value function iteration step is to solve the maximization problem on the right hand
side of (1) and (2). Even though one may need more iteration steps, one can still greatly accelerate the solution of
the model by not solving for new policy functions in every iteration.
35spell duration t by ^ k(k;w;¸;t). This is naturally de¯ned by:
^ k(k;w;¸;1) = k
^ k(k;w;¸;t) = ~ ku
³
^ k(k;w;¸;t ¡ 1);w;¸
´
; t = 2;3;::::
Finally, denote the search intensity for a worker with initial wealth k; wage w and o®er arrival rate
¸ at duration t by ^ s(k;w;¸;t): This is de¯ned by:




; t = 1;2;::::
The method of approximating the policy functions over not only wealth and wages but also over
the o®er arrival rate allows for easy estimation of many ¯ and unobserved heterogeneity parameters
because one does not have to simulate the model for any new choice of ¯ and G. The only time one
must re-simulate the model is when a new µ is tried. Simulating the model is quite computation
intensive and it imposes a natural limit on how many structural parameters one can include in µ.
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